Remarkably Naïve …

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BY Michael Panzner
In “Economists: Wrong Again,” I highlighted a major flaw in the logic of those Keynesian Kool-Aid drinkers who believe current low yields and stable markets can be seen as validation of Washington’s aggressive policy of spending and borrowing to “rescue” the crisis-hit U.S. economy.
This is not the only reason to be skeptical. As I noted in Financial Armageddon and in posts like “The Real Threat to Financial Economic Stability,” the U.S. already has far more obligations relative to resources than it can reasonably afford once you factor in the value of social safety net obligations (e.g., Medicare and Social Security) and implicit and explicit financial guarantees (e.g., Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
But even if you only take explicit liabilities into account, the suggestion that the fallout from current policies can easily be dealt with after the economy recovers — whenever that might be — seems remarkably naïve. In the following excerpt from a post at Econbrowser, “Yes the Future Deficits Are Worrisome,” economist James Hamilton says as much:
Paul Krugman ([1], [2], [3]) has been arguing vigorously that U.S. budget deficits are no cause for concern. I see things differently.
One of the arguments that Krugman makes is that, although the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to double over a short period, the higher level would still be substantially below those currently observed in Italy and Japan, and only modestly above that of Belgium. Paul suggests that if these countries can run up debts of this magnitude without serious repercussions, so can the United States.
Source: Paul Krugman.
But European politics may not import all that well to this side of the Atlantic. Receipts of the U.S. federal government have never exceeded 21% of U.S. GDP, even at the height of World War II. A permanent move to taxation levels significantly above that would require a major shift in the political landscape, for which I see no consensus of support. To me that implies that any spending trajectory inconsistent with the long-established U.S. norm may be headed for a political brick wall.
Federal receipts and outlays as a percentage of GDP, 1970-2008 and 2009 estimates. Data source: OMB.
One of the ways I have suggested for personalizing this issue stems from the observation that $1 trillion is approximately the total personal income tax receipts collected by the U. S. federal government in 2006. So, to calculate what another trillion in deficits means for me personally, I take the amount I paid in federal income taxes that year and double it; $10 trillion in new debt will require 10 years at that higher rate to pay off. It’s going to be a real problem for any politician who tries to service the growing debt burden by raising taxes. That’s why I see troubles ahead for managing the federal cash flow.But Paul feels I’m using an inappropriate metric:
Jim gets scary numbers about the debt burden by assuming that we’ll have to pay off the debt in 10 years. But why would we have to do that? Again, the lesson of the 1950s– or, if you like, the lesson of Belgium and Italy, which brought their debt-GDP ratios down from early 90s levels– is that you need to stabilize debt, not pay it off; economic growth will do the rest.
Normally, you’d think that putting off repaying a debt does not make it any smaller. The federal government can (with my wallet) pay the trillion today, or it can wait 10 years to pay one trillion plus 10 years’ interest, or wait 20 years to pay one trillion plus 20 years’ interest. The present value of the service cost on one trillion dollars in debt is exactly one trillion dollars today, no matter how long you put off paying. My comments on how much a trillion really is are perfectly appropriate for discussion of any repayment timetable.
Perhaps Paul is suggesting that there may be a potential free lunch available from postponing payment in this case, arising from the fact that the economy’s growth rate has historically exceeded the government’s cost of borrowing. If I put off paying another year, with interest the amount I owe grows 2% in real terms, but my income grows 3%, so things get easier the longer I put it off.
Let me go on the record as favoring the consumption of truly free lunches. If everything the government buys really is free, then by all means, let’s have them buy more, and more, and more, and rather than double my taxes, let’s cut taxes all the way to zero. Unfortunately, I expect that Paul would agree with me that in fact there is a limit to just how much we can count on supersizing this particular happy meal. At least I know that he entertained such concerns, as Scrivener and Verdon note, when in March of 2003, Paul contemplated the implications of the debt-to-GDP ratio that was then reaching 40%:
we’re looking at a fiscal crisis that will drive interest rates sky-high…. But what’s really scary… is the looming threat to the federal government’s solvency.
What I presume was producing Paul’s concerns in 2003, and is giving rise to my concerns today as well, is the fact that the low cost of government borrowing relative to the economic growth rate– which could produce the apparent free-lunch calculus– is predicated on the historical political equilibrium, which Paul worried might not be continued after 2003, and I certainly worry might not be continued after 2009. Specifically, I would suggest that the low borrowing cost that the U.S. government traditionally faced was very much attributable to the responsible management of the debt. Once that responsibility becomes called into question, the U.S. will cease to enjoy that privilege. This kind of problem gets messier, not neater, the longer you put it off. And that’s why you might not want to assume that an apparent free snack can be scaled up to an unlimited feast.



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